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 1 
THE OBJECT VIEW OF PERCEPTION 
 
 
We perceive a world of mind-independent macroscopic material objects such as 
stones, tables, trees, and animals. Our experience is the joint upshot of the way 
these things are and our route through them, along with the various relevant 
circumstances of perception; and it depends on the normal operation of our 
perceptual systems. Such perceptual experience is a rich and varied conscious 
condition that makes a significant contribution to our capacity for thought and 
knowledge of the world. How should we characterize this experience so as to 
respect its basis and explain its role in grounding empirical thought and 
knowledge? I offered an answer to this question in Perception and Its Objects 
(Brewer, 2011). Here I aim to clarify some of my central arguments and to 
develop and defend the position further in the light of subsequent critical 
discussion.1 
 
                                                        
1 I am grateful to many colleagues and students for very helpful discussions of 
the book since its publication. Here I draw especially on excellent contributions 
to an Author Meets Critics symposium on Perception and Its Objects at the 2014 
Central APA in Chicago by Berit Brogaard and Adam Pautz. Previous versions of 
this material were also presented at workshops in Trondheim and Antwerp. 
Many thanks to all the participants for helpful discussion at these events. 
Particular thanks to the following for their suggestions. Louise Antony, John 
Campbell, Craig French, Katrin Gluer, Carsten Hansen, David Hilbert, Jonathan 
Knowles, Heather Logue, Brian McLaughlin, Mike Martin, Bence Nanay, Anders 
Nes, Thomas Raleigh, Susanna Schellenberg, and Wayne Wu. I am also very 
grateful for two excellent sets of comments from anonymous reviewers for 
Topoi. The revisions that I have had the space and ability to make here in the 
light of their comments have made a significant improvement. Other issues 
remain for further work. 
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I begin in §1 with a brief overview of the project: to state and motivate the Object 
View, (OV). In §2 I consider various objections to my arguments against its 
orthodox alternative, the Content View, (CV). §3 turns to a defense of (OV) itself 
against objection. 
 
§1 The Object View 
 
There are no doubt other approaches to the taxonomy of theories of perception; 
but I regard the most basic question in the area as this. What is the most 
fundamental nature of our perceptual relation with the material world around 
us, e.g. of my seeing a laptop before me now? I understand this as a request for 
an account of what it is to perceive that is both explanatorily adequate and 
metaphysically acceptable. That is, the proposed account should explain and 
unify the characteristic features of perception, such as its phenomenology and its 
role in making thought and knowledge of the world possible, in a way that meets 
the general criteria for evaluating metaphysical theories: what is required for 
perception must be consistent with our best overall account of what there is. 
 
I see three broad categories of answer to the basic question. First, perception 
consists most fundamentally in a relation of acquaintance with various mind-
dependent sensations. A subsidiary question is then whether these are 
themselves elements of a mind-dependent material world or whether they are, 
normally at least, appropriately causally dependent upon sufficiently resembling 
mind-independent material objects as to constitute our indirect perception of 
such things. Second, perception consists most fundamentally in our 
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representation of things as being thus and so in the mind-independent world 
around us. Crucial subsidiary questions then concern the experiential mode of 
representation, its content, and also the relations between these and 
phenomenological character. Third, perception consists most fundamentally in a 
relation of acquaintance directly with the constituents of the mind-independent 
world. Perception and Its Objects offers arguments against the first and second 
of these, along with an extended development and defense of a specific version of 
the third. 
 
This Object View, (OV), takes the basic worldly relata of the acquaintance 
relation to be mind-independent material objects. Acquaintance is construed as 
an unanalysable conscious relation that we are enabled to stand in with such 
things by the normal functioning of our brains and perceptual systems. Distinct 
experiences may have identical objects of acquaintance, though. For example, 
experiences of a round red disc head on, from a wide angle, or edge on, in bright 
or dim lighting conditions, as so on. So a simple appeal to the object of 
acquaintance is inadequate to explain the nature of our various experiences of 
the same thing. We are acquainted with the objects around us from a given 
spatiotemporal point of view and in certain specific circumstances of perception; 
and (OV) treats these factors as a third relatum of the relation of acquaintance 
that holds between perceivers and the objects of perception. Focusing 
throughout on vision, our experiences are cases of being visually acquainted 
with a particular mind-independent material object from a given spatiotemporal 
point of view and in certain specific circumstances. 
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Now the objects that we see look various ways to us. The core of the (OV) 
account of looks is that an object of acquaintance o thinly looks F iff o has, from 
the point of view and in the circumstances of perception in question, appropriate 
visually relevant similarities with paradigm exemplars of F. These are 
similarities by the lights of the various processes enabling and subserving visual 
acquaintance: similarities in such things as the way in which light is reflected and 
transmitted from the objects in question and the way in which stimuli are 
handled by the visual system, given its evolutionary history and our shared 
training during development. Furthermore, some, but not all, of these thin looks 
will be salient to us in any particular case, for example, as we switch between the 
duck and rabbit looks of the duck-rabbit diagram. I say that an object, o, thickly 
looks F iff o thinly looks F and the subject registers its visually relevant 
similarities with paradigm exemplars of F. The paradigm case of registration as I 
understand it involves the active deployment of the concept of an F; but (OV) 
also recognizes a variety of significantly less demanding modes of registration, 
including those involved in systematic behavioural responses, such as simple 
sorting, and those involved in the noticing of various organizational, 
orientational, or other gestalt phenomena. 
 
Illusory experiences, in which o looks F although it is not, are cases of 
acquaintance with an object from a point of view or in circumstances in which it 
has visually relevant similarities with paradigm F’s although it is not itself an 
instance of F. These similarities may but need not in turn be registered. 
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Hallucinations, on the other hand, are cases of experiences without looks-
grounding objects of acquaintance, whose correct theoretical characterization is 
rather that they are not distinguishable by introspection alone from cases of 
acquaintance with a given qualitative scene from a specific point of view. Some 
experiences pre-theoretically classified as illusions may involve a conjunction of 
successful acquaintance with some degree of hallucination in this sense caused 
by the relevant worldly objects. Furthermore, since acquaintance depends on the 
satisfaction of significant and highly complex physiological enabling conditions, 
there will also be abnormal experiences that are correctly to be characterized in 
terms of partial failures in acquaintance: cases of degraded acquaintance. These 
cases of total and partial failure of acquaintance are essentially derivative of the 
success that grounds veridical and illusory, thin and thick, looks, according to 
(OV). Assimilating all such cases is incompatible with giving an adequate 
explanation of the fundamental role of perception in grounding thought and 
knowledge about the mind-independent world. To reiterate a slogan of the book, 
the ways that things look to a person in perception are in the first instance the 
looks of the very mind-independent things that she is consciously acquainted 
with from the point of view and in the circumstances in question.2 
 
I develop a number of these ideas in §3 below in response to specific objections 
to the explanatory adequacy of (OV). 
 
§2 Against (CV) 
                                                        
2 See Martin (2010) for an alternative development of the slogan on which looks 
are intrinsic properties of perceivable worldly objects rather than anything 
dependent on the perceiver’s point of view and circumstances. 
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Objections have been given to my three main arguments against the Content 
View, (CV), according to which perception is instead most fundamentally a 
matter of experientially entertaining contents concerning the way things are in 
the mind-independent world. I consider each of these in turn. 
 
§2.1. Falsity 
 
According to (CV), paradigm cases of illusion are visual experiences that 
represent an external object, o, as F although it is not F. This basic idea of a false 
representational content concerning o involves no limit on the nature and extent 
of the error involved in predicating F of o.3,4 Yet the objects of our visual illusions 
are presented in experience - we actually see them – and there are significant 
limits on the nature and extent of the errors compatible with genuine 
experiential presentation. For example, if it looks to me as though there is a black 
cube in front of me, then this is not a case of seeing the white disc that is actually 
                                                        
3 This may require qualification. Perhaps there are attempted ‘category mistake’ 
contents that do not succeed in even representing an object of one category as 
possessing a property appropriate to a quite different category of object; and 
perhaps genuinely entertaining the content that a is F is not possible in the 
absence of a broadly accurate conception of what kind of thing a is. I do not take 
a stand on either of these suggestions here. For the limits on error that they 
impose are relatively minimal. The limits on error compatible with experiential 
presentation are still significantly more demanding. 
4 Here and throughout I use the notion of a content, p, concerning an object, o, 
very broadly, to include at least the ideas that p involves singular reference to o 
and that o is relevant to the evaluation of p because o (uniquely) satisfies certain 
general conditions explicitly mentioned in p’s truth-conditions, perhaps along 
with certain causal conditions on the particular entertaining of p in question. The 
relevance of this breadth will emerge in §2.2 below. 
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there, even if this is in some way responsible for the cube appearance.5 My first 
objection is that (CV) cannot resolve this tension. For it offers no explanation of 
these limits on error compatible with seeing. 
 
Proponents of (CV) may reply that it is no requirement on the theory to provide 
such an explanation.6 On their view, our perceptual relation with the world 
around us is a matter of experientially entertaining certain contents. Seeing o 
involves experientially entertaining a content, p, concerning o, provided that any 
errors in p are within certain limits.7 But it is not the responsibility of a theory of 
perception to state what those limits are, or why those are the limits governing 
perceptual presentation, or even where one might go to find out the answers to 
these questions. Indeed, it may be objected further that (OV) is in the end in 
exactly the same position vis-a-vis explaining the limits on error compatible with 
seeing. I take these two points in turn. 
 
An analogy may be helpful in seeking to justify this rejection of the explanatory 
requirement that I argue (CV) objectionably fails to meet.8 Consider Williamson’s 
response to the Gettier literature (1995, 2002). Williamson grants that it is no 
objection to the idea that belief is a necessary condition on knowledge that no 
explanation, or conjunctive analysis, can be given of which (true) beliefs are and 
                                                        
5 Perhaps there are extraordinary circumstances in which this is possible. But 
this simply sharpens rather than blunts the objection. For (OV) does and (CV) 
does not offer an explanatory account of what such extraordinary circumstances 
must achieve. 
6 This objection is due to Pautz. 
7 There are no doubt further necessary conditions required for joint sufficiency 
according to (CV). I discuss the introduction of causal conditions in §2.2 below. 
8 The analogy, like the objection, is due to Pautz. 
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which are not cases of knowledge. Similarly, my opponent claims that it is no 
objection to the idea that experientially entertaining a content concerning o is a 
necessary condition on seeing o that no explanation can be given of which 
contents concerning o are within the limits on error required for seeing o and 
which fall outside these limits. 
 
This seems right to me, so far as it goes. But I take Williamson’s central claim to 
be that knowledge is basic: “knowledge first”, as he puts it (2002, p. v). Knowing 
that p is the most fundamental condition in the area, not to be explained in other 
terms, but rather capable itself of illuminating the involvement of more 
derivative cognitive conditions such as believing that p. This is what makes his 
acknowledgement of believing as a necessary condition on knowing consistent 
with the motivated rejection of any need for an account or explanation of any 
‘additional’ conditions on knowing. And Williamson’s ‘knowledge first’ thesis is 
precisely analogous to my own (OV) reaction in the case of perception. Conscious 
acquaintance, actually seeing o, is the most fundamental condition in the area. 
Taking this as basic it is possible to explain the various ways that things look in 
perception. Taking the way things look, which may be either veridical or illusory, 
as basic, on the other hand, as (CV) does, it is impossible to work up from there 
to any adequate account of seeing the things in the world around us. Yet that is 
precisely what is required by the (CV) commitment to the idea that our 
perceptual relation with the world is most fundamentally a matter of 
experientially entertaining contents concerning the way things are in the mind-
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independent world.9 The analogy with Williamson harms rather than helps 
(CV).10 
 
Furthermore, in response to the second point above, unlike (CV), (OV) does have 
an explanation of the limits of error in illusion compatible with seeing, although 
of course it starts with seeing itself and derives the limits on error rather than 
vice versa. Given acquaintance with o, there are limits on the ways o may look: it 
may look just those ways, F, such that o has, from the point of view of 
acquaintance and in the circumstances in question, visually relevant similarities 
with paradigm exemplars of F. 11 
                                                        
9 See §3.1 below for further discussion of the precise opposition between (OV) 
and (CV). 
10 This evaluation of the current argument depends on my characterization of 
(CV) as the thesis that perception consists most fundamentally in our 
representation of things as being thus and so in the mind-independent world 
around us. An alternative to (CV) so construed might accept that perception is 
not itself most fundamentally a matter of representation, but nevertheless insist 
that the experiential aspect of perception is fundamentally representational. This 
move requires a distinction between perception itself, which may not ultimately 
be a matter of representation at all, and perceptual experience, which is. I resist 
this distinction, although of course I do not assume from the outset that 
perceptual experience is object-involving. The phenomenon about whose 
fundamental nature I take (OV) and (CV) to be offering alternative accounts is 
precisely our conscious perception of the world around us. That fundamental 
nature should, as I explained at the outset, provide at least the basis for a unified 
account of the phenomenology of perception and its role in making thought and 
knowledge of the world possible. If any such unified account is demonstrably 
impossible, then it might be necessary to divide and conquer broadly perceptual 
phenomena. But I take the primary debate here to concern the possibility and 
shape of unified views. 
11 Might it be possible for (CV) simply to take over this (OV) account of the errors 
compatible with seeing? Certainly, if the (OV) proposal is correct, then the 
stipulation of an additional necessary condition on seeing o that o be 
represented as F from a point of view and in circumstances where o has visually 
relevant similarities with paradigm exemplars of F will be extensionally 
adequate. But, unlike (OV), (CV) has absolutely no explanation of why this should 
be the correct additional condition on their view. I claim that this makes the 
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According to (CV), our perceptual relation with the material world is most 
fundamentally a matter of our experientially entertaining certain 
representational contents concerning the way things are in the mind-
independent world. Its current challenge is to explain which errors in such 
contents concerning a particular material object o are compatible with actually 
seeing o. I cannot see how this is supposed satisfactorily to be met. According to 
(OV), on the other hand, our perceptual relation with the material world is most 
fundamentally a matter of our conscious acquaintance with the constituents of 
the mind-independent world around us. Its corresponding challenge is to explain 
which ways, both ways that o is and ways that o is not, o may look, given that we 
are acquainted with that very thing from a given spatiotemporal point of view 
and in certain specific circumstances. Unlike (CV), (OV) at least attempts to meet 
precisely this challenge. O thinly looks F iff o has, from the point of view and in 
the circumstances of perception in question, appropriate visually relevant 
similarities with paradigm exemplars of F. O thickly looks F iff o thinly looks F 
and the subject registers its visually relevant similarities with paradigm 
exemplars of F. Notice also that this account has the further advantage that it 
accommodates and explains the dependence of the errors compatible with 
seeing in any particular case upon the specific point of view and other 
circumstances of perception involved in that case of acquaintance with the 
relevant worldly object. 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
proposed stipulation unacceptably ad hoc in the current context, and especially 
so in comparison to the motivated unity of (OV). 
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§2.2. Generality. 
 
The most natural development of (CV) characterizes the contents that we 
experientially entertain in perception purely generally, in terms of the various 
predicates that are apparently instantiated by whatever it may be that we 
perceive, or fail to perceive, before us. Yet perceptual presentation is manifestly 
particular. Seeing is a conscious relation that we stand in to particular worldly 
objects. So (CV) faces the question what determines the particularity of the 
perceptual relation. The objection from falsity considered above concerns the 
degree of correspondence, or ‘fit’, that must be involved between the predicates 
ascribed by the relevant content, p, and the actual condition of the object, o, seen. 
Whatever the required fit may be, the contents that we experientially entertain 
nevertheless fit indefinitely many numerically, and indeed qualitatively, distinct 
actual and possible material objects. The current problem is to specify what 
determines the unique particular such object that we actually see on any given 
occasion. 
 
The obvious solution is to appeal to the causal explanation of our entertaining 
the content p on the occasion in question. O will be the object appropriately 
involved in that causal explanation. A first difficulty for this solution is to specify 
exactly what appropriate involvement is supposed to be. Many objects, perhaps 
even many within the required degree of fit, may be involved in some way in the 
causal explanation of our entertaining p on a given occasion. What mode of 
involvement uniquely identifies o as the object that we see? This is of course a 
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very familiar problem that has generated a large literature.12 It is absolutely 
genuine, though, and the complete lack of consensus in its solution may well lead 
one again directly to an analogue of Williamson’s ‘knowledge first’ response to 
the Gettier literature: seeing an object is basic, a matter of being consciously 
acquainted with o from a given point of view and in certain circumstances of 
perception, precisely as (OV) contends, rather than being any kind of composite 
of experientially entertaining a content, p, in some way concerning o, along with 
the satisfaction of further necessary and jointly sufficient conditions.13 
 
                                                        
12 See, e.g, Grice (1961), Pears (1976), Strawson (1979), Snowdon (1980), Lewis 
(1980), Hyman (1992), Child (1994), and Roessler, Lerman, and Eilan (2011). 
13 In his APA comments Pautz suggests a different response, again aiming to limit 
(CV) proponents’ explanatory commitments. The proposal conjoins the thesis 
that seeing o involves experientially entertaining an appropriately accurate 
content concerning o that is appropriately caused by o with the insistence that 
no explanation can or need be given of what appropriate causation may be: it is 
simply that causal involvement that makes experiential entertaining into vision. I 
reply as above (§2.1) that this may be motivated in the context of (OV), according 
to which conscious acquaintance with o is basic, from a point of view and in 
circumstances in which o derivatively looks, F, for a whole range of F. If we 
collect together a set of situations in which it is for a person as if something looks 
F and ask the question what more is the case in some of these situations in virtue 
of which the subject actually sees a worldly object o, then we may reasonably 
answer simply that these are the situations in which it is as if something looks F 
because o looks F because she is acquainted with o from a point of view and in 
circumstances in which it has visually relevant similarities with paradigm 
exemplars of F. There is no need for any kind of explanation of the specific kind 
of causal involvement that o has in her experiential condition. (CV), on the other 
hand takes the condition of experientially entertaining a content concerning o as 
basic and admits that in some but not all of the cases in which this obtains the 
subject sees o. The suggestion that these are the cases in which o is causally 
involved in the explanation of her experientially entertaining the relevant 
content in such a way as to make it the case that she sees it, whatever exactly 
that way may be, is at the very least an unhelpful and uninformative addition. If 
nothing better could possibly be done, then perhaps one could learn to live with 
the disappointment. But this is absolutely not the situation. In any case, the 
primary focus of my objection here is independent of that adjudication. 
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Suppose for the sake of argument that this first difficulty may be overcome. My 
principal objection from generality remains. (CV) fails the requirement of 
explanatory adequacy on any satisfactory theory of perception in connection 
with the role of perceptual experience in explaining our capacity for reference to 
particular material objects in the world around us (see Campbell, 2002a and 
2002b). Intuitively, in many cases at least, and perhaps in the most basic cases, 
this capacity for reference depends upon our conscious perception of the 
particular objects in question. The reason that I can refer determinately to that 
particular bottle of San Pellegrino on my desk, as opposed to any of the others 
that may be littered around my office, say, and that I genuinely understand which 
bottle it is that I am referring to, is that I see it right there in front of me. One may 
of course reject this intuitive explanatory role of perception in relation to 
reference. But it seems to me to be extremely robust and I assume it without 
further argument in what follows. The difficulty now for the current version of 
(CV) is that that particular bottle is supposed to be entirely extrinsic to the 
fundamental nature of my perceptual-experiential condition: selected simply by 
the additional causal conditions whatever exactly these may be. So it is quite 
mysterious how being in that perceptual condition is supposed to explain my 
capacity to refer, with understanding, to that very bottle as opposed to any other. 
It is effectively an additional assumption of this objection that the contribution to 
the subject’s understanding that is made by a conscious mental condition that he 
may be in is restricted to what is intrinsic to the fundamental nature of that very 
condition. I entirely accept that this is highly controversial. But I endorse the 
restriction and explicitly make the additional assumption here.14 
                                                        
14 This issue clearly interacts closely with debates concerning internalism v 
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Again, there may appear to be a straightforward solution: to claim that reference 
to the particular object that is seen is intrinsic to the content that characterizes 
the fundamental nature of our perceptual experience according to (CV). The 
result is still explanatorily inadequate, though. For experientially entertaining 
the proposed content now simply presupposes what seeing o is supposed to 
explain, namely, our capacity for reference to that very object. The requirement 
is to give perceiving o an explanatory role in connection with our capacity for 
reference to o. Yet the revised (CV) account characterizes perceiving o precisely 
in terms of reference to o: a matter of experientially entertaining a content that 
itself refers to o.15 
                                                                                                                                                              
externalism about thought content. I regard these as helpfully organized around 
the following inconsistent triad. (1) Content supervenes upon what is 
subjectively accessible; (2) What is subjectively accessible superveness upon 
(physical) condition from the skin in. (3) Content does not supervene upon 
(physical) condition from the skin in. Orthodox internalists (e.g. Searle, 1983) 
accept (1) and (2) and reject (3) along with the various Putnam/Burge-style 
thought-experiments that motivate (3). Orthodox externalists (e.g. Putnam, 1975 
and Burge, 1979) accept (2) and (3) and reject (1) along with the kind of 
restriction governing understanding that I endorse here. My own reaction, 
following McDowell as I understand him (esp. Pettit and McDowell, 1986, 
Introduction, and McDowell, 1986), is to accept (1) and (3) and reject (2). 
15 Supporters of (CV) may at this point invoke a distinction between modes of 
reference to particulars. Judgement, with reflective understanding, involves fully 
conceptual reference, whereas perceptual experiential content involves only 
non-conceptual reference. Thus, the contents constitutive of the fundamental 
nature of perceptual experience may without circularity explain our capacity for 
reference to worldly particulars in judgement. I have two doubts about this 
proposal. First, I stand by the general objections to characterizing perceptual 
experience in terms of non-conceptual representational content advanced 
elsewhere (esp. 1999, ch. 5). Second, the revised (CV) account is still without any 
non-circular explanation of the mode of genuine reference to particulars that is 
supposedly involved in that very experience. Yet the initial explanatory datum 
apparently remains in force: any capacity that we may have for perceptually-
based reference of any kind to particular mind-independent objects is to be 
explained on the basis of the nature of our conscious perception of those very 
things. 
 15 
 
So (CV) faces a dilemma. If reference to o is extrinsic to perceptual content, then 
perception is incapable of explaining our capacity for reference; if reference to o 
is intrinsic to perceptual content then perception presupposes our capacity for 
reference and is therefore again incapable of explaining it. (OV) seizes upon the 
obvious structural solution. Perception is most fundamentally a matter of our 
acquaintance, from a given point of view and in specific circumstances, with the 
material objects in the world around us: a relation that is particular in its key 
worldly relatum, yet not a matter of entertaining any kind of perceptual 
representational content. Thus, it is at least intelligible how perceptual 
experience may play a genuinely explanatory role in connection with our 
capacity for reference, with understanding, to those very things. 
 
§2.3. Determinacy 
 
My third objection to (CV) is rather a challenge to its proponents to give an 
adequate account of which contents specific perceptual experiences have, and 
why. Once again, a possible reply presents this as an unmotivated demand for 
some kind of analytic reduction of perceptual content to more basic facts about 
perceivers. Some theorists offer such;16 but others deny independently that it 
can or must be given.17 Perhaps, as Pautz puts it (2014, p. 6) “the non-intentional 
facts determine what contents a person experientially entertains, even though 
there is no finitely specifiable, general algorithm for going from the non-
                                                        
16 E.g. Dretske (1981), Millikan (1984), Fodor (1987), and Tye (1995, 2000). 
17 E.g. Pautz (2010, 2014). 
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intentional facts to the facts about experiential content”. In that case, my 
challenge is no real threat to (CV): it can simply be swept aside. 
 
This is not how I see situation, although I grant that this is not clear from the 
discussion in my book. The challenge is rather that there are plausible features of 
the content-like aspects of perception that are quite unintelligible on the 
assumption that the perceptual system simply serves up specific experiential 
contents fully formed and without any explanatory dependence upon more basic 
experiential facts in particular cases. In contrast, I claim that (OV) does provide 
the required intelligible explanations. 
 
The features that I have in mind are twofold. First, thin looks are massively 
varied and multiply nested. A splash of paint may simultaneously (thinly) look 
red, bright red, scarlet, shade r27, … zig-zag, snake-like, the shape of a crotchet 
(quarter-note) rest, …, whereas (CV) proposes that the system serves up single 
colour and shape predicates in terms of which it is supposed determinately to be 
classified in experience. Second the far more specific thick looks that are 
registered by a perceiver acquainted with a given object on a particular occasion 
are systematically dependent upon her experience to date, her interests and 
projects at the time, and so on: upon which questions she is posing of the object 
of her perception on that occasion. Again, the (CV) idea that experience simply 
selects one answer is incompatible with the presence of a whole world to her in 
experience that she interrogates in these specifically directed ways. The rich 
completeness of the world itself and the particular answers to her specific 
concerns that she ascertains from it in directed perception are both part of the 
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way things look to her. Yet (CV) compresses these two quite different levels of 
looks into a single layer of perceptual representational content. So I claim that 
content-determination really is a problem for (CV). Its flat and one-dimensional 
appeal to specific experientially entertained contents simply served up to the 
subject by the system lacks the richness, variety, and depth required to capture 
the manifold looks of the worldly objects that we perceive.18 
 
It may be objected in return that the range and variety of thin looks entailed by 
(OV) constitutes a problem for the position rather than a challenge to its 
opponents.19 For this is effectively to embrace a kind of indeterminacy in the way 
things look in any particular case.20 A white piece of chalk under red 
illumination, for example, thinly looks red and thinly looks white-in-red-light: its 
look bears both descriptions. Likewise, a red piece of chalk under normal white 
illumination thinly looks red and thinly looks white-in-red-light. The 
phenomenon is quite general, and may appear to stand in the way of appealing to 
the looks of things in explaining our detection of specific features of the worldly 
objects around us on the basis of perception, such as the redness, as opposed to 
whiteness (in red light) of a red piece of chalk. But that appearance would be 
                                                        
18 It is of course open to proponents of (CV) to expand their palette by invoking 
multiple layers of contents available in perception in order to accommodate both 
the rich and intricately nested thin looks and the interest-dependent specific 
thick looks that worldly objects have in perception. But this still leaves a 
challenge to explain the unity and grounding of this complex superstructure of 
perceptual contents in the fundamental nature of the experiences that bear them. 
See Peacocke’s (1992) appeal to both scenario and proto-propositional levels of 
non-conceptual content for what is perhaps the most powerful and fully worked 
out such (CV) account. 
19 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for Topoi for pressing this line of concern. 
20 Travis (2004) presents an important and influential argument also exploiting 
this phenomenon against the idea that perception has representational content 
along the lines proposed by (CV). 
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misleading. For our registration of some but not others of the visually relevant 
similarities with various paradigms that the objects of our acquaintance actually 
have from the points of view and in the circumstances of our acquaintance with 
them constitutes our being struck by, or noticing, determinate such looks. Thus 
things thickly look specific ways to us in a sense that thereby contributes to our 
detection of their specific features. Furthermore, as noted in section §1 above, 
the cognitive demands on the most basic forms of such registration may be really 
quite minimal. So determinate specificity in environmental detection is relatively 
straightforward to attain.21 
 
§3 Defence of (OV) 
 
My own (OV) has also been subject serious objection, both in principle and in 
connection with specific, largely non-ideal, experiential phenomena. I begin with 
two principled considerations (§§3.1 & 3.2) and then turn to the specific cases 
(§3.3). 
 
§3.1. Opposition 
 
§3.1.1 (OV) & (CV) 
 
                                                        
21 See Brewer (2011, ch. 6) for a full discussion of the (OV) account of 
determinate perceptual knowledge. 
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Is (OV) really in opposition to all versions of (CV)?22 My simple answer is ‘yes’, as 
I define them. According to (OV), the most fundamental characterization of our 
perceptual relation with the world is in terms of our acquaintance with mind-
independent objects, whereas (CV) claims that this is in terms of our 
experientially entertaining various truth-evaluable contents. I take the most 
fundamental characterization to be unique and these two candidates are distinct. 
So the views are incompatible. But the situation is in reality less straight forward. 
 
First, as I have already stressed, (OV) entirely accepts that there are content-like 
characterizations of our perceptual conditions. Indeed, it offers detailed 
explanations of specific such thin and thick looks on the basis of the relata of 
conscious acquaintance on any particular occasion: the worldly objects of 
acquaintance and the point of view from which, and circumstances in which, the 
perceiver is acquainted with them. So, far from being inconsistent with the claim 
that perception always involves something content-like, (OV) goes to great 
lengths to develop a nuanced account of the thin and thick looks that accordingly 
capture its ‘content’. Various truths of the form ‘o looks F to S’ are its recognition 
of what (CV) elucidates in terms of S (visually) experientially entertaining the 
content that o is F. The point is that (OV) takes acquaintance as basic and 
explanatorily derives the wide variety of ways in which the objects that we are 
acquainted with may look, rather than taking the idea of experientially 
entertaining the content that p as fundamental and aiming to provide a complete 
theory of perception on that basis instead. 
                                                        
22 This question and the discussion that follows are prompted by Brogaard’s 
comments at the Chicago APA. 
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Second, there are versions of (CV) that propose object-dependent contents for 
perceptual experience. It is a necessary condition on entertaining such contents 
that the perceiver be suitably related to the worldly objects in question. So in this 
sense perception may be a relation to such things according to (CV) too. 
Nevertheless, provided that it adopts the attitude that perception is most 
fundamentally a matter of experientially entertaining such contents concerning 
the way things are in the mind-independent world, then this is precisely a 
variant of (CV), as I understand it, and it is therefore intended at least to be 
subject to the objections that I have just been rehearsing. 
 
Third, there might also be a possible version of (CV) with purely Russellian 
perceptual contents composed of worldly objects and their perceptible property 
instances. As with the object-dependent view, it follows from entertaining such 
contents that one stands in a derived relation with particular worldly objects; 
but the property side of the perceptual condition is again taken as equally basic 
rather than being an intelligible consequence of the nature of the object of 
acquaintance, point of view, and circumstances, as on (OV). So, again, the 
problems of generality and content-determination remain. Furthermore, I take it 
that this variant of (CV) looses what is often regarded as its major advantage in 
offering an account of illusion and hallucination in terms of false perceptual 
contents. For in such cases there are simply not the objects and property 
instances to serve as constituents of an appropriate Russellian content. This may 
be an advantage by the lights of the (OV) objection from falsity to (CV), but, 
correlatively, a disadvantage by the normal lights of proponents of (CV) 
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themselves. I myself also have reservations about the metaphysical standing of 
the proposed property instances. In any case, such a view is certainly not a 
‘technical variant’ of (OV), as Brogaard suggests (2013). It is once again a variant 
of (CV) in opposition to (OV). 
 
Fourth, and finally, returning to my initial characterization of the two views, is 
there not room for a no-priority view intermediate between (CV) and (OV), on 
which acquaintance with particular worldly objects and experientially 
entertaining perceptual contents are independent and equally fundamental? In 
order to assess any specific such proposal it would be necessary to see the 
details. But I do have general concerns about the basic idea that shape my own 
division and evaluation of the available options. If the (OV) account of looks on 
the basis of acquaintance is even close to right, then the postulation of an 
independent and equally fundamental content characterization of perception is 
unmotivated and unnecessary; and a no-priority view would in any case be 
subject at least to the content-determination problem outlined above. 
Furthermore, given their independence, what would be supposed to rule out 
potential conflict between the acquaintance and content bases of perception in 
any particular case?23 
 
§3.1.2 (OV) & (IR) 
                                                        
23 I entirely acknowledge that this response is far too brief as it stands to refute 
the very idea of a no-priority view. Each such account deserves extended and 
detailed discussion on its own merits. My stand for present purposes is on the 
insistence that the appeal to an equally fundamental and independent content 
characterization of perception is motivated only to the extent that the (OV) 
account of looks is demonstrably unsatisfactory. I aim to show in §§3.2 & 3.3 
below that this is not obviously the case. 
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I distinguished three categories of answer to the basic taxonomic question for 
theories of perception: what is the most fundamental nature of our perceptual 
relation with the material world around us? (CV) and (OV) constitute the second 
and third respectively. It has also been objected that (OV) is committed to 
something like an indirect realist version of the first, according to which 
perception consists most fundamentally in a relation of acquaintance with 
various mind-dependent sensations.24 The idea is that the (OV) emphasis on the 
point of view of acquaintance in accounting for the way things look in perception 
effectively assimilates the position to one on which our perceptual relation with 
indirect external objects of perception is somehow the result of computations on 
more basic direct objects such as retinal images. 
 
Of course I agree that retinal image size, say, depends on the distance from 
worldly object to viewpoint. But there is no obvious reason to believe that every 
theory that gives the perceiver’s point of view a role in accounting for the way 
things look is committed to regarding such retinal images as the direct objects of 
perception in any sense. Computations on ‘retinal images’ are essential 
physiological enabling conditions on our visual acquaintance with worldly 
things; but this is conscious acquaintance with them – the worldly objects – and 
not with such retinal images that are not objects of perception at all. 
Furthermore, the way things look in perception, according to (OV), is to be 
understood in terms of the looks, from certain points of view and in certain 
circumstances, of those very worldly objects of acquaintance themselves, rather 
                                                        
24 This objection is due to Brogaard. 
 23 
than being accounted for in terms of the nature of any mind-dependent 
supposed objects of acquaintance. 
 
§3.2. Indistinguishability 
 
According to (OV), visual acquaintance is an unanalyzable conscious relation 
between subjects, mind-independent worldly objects, and their spatiotemporal 
point of view and relevant circumstances that we are enabled to stand in by the 
evolutionarily established integration of our perceptual systems with the 
relevant ways of the world. It provides the explanatory ground of the most basic 
ways that things look to us in perception. The explanations that (OV) provides of 
the way things look in perception on the basis of such acquaintance have the 
consequence that introspectively indistinguishable looks may be grounded in 
quite distinct relata of acquaintance. This is so, not just in the case of 
acquaintance with perfect duplicates in identical viewing conditions, but also, as 
we have already seen, for example, between cases of acquaintance with a red 
wall in normal lighting conditions and with a white wall bathed in red light; or 
between cases of acquaintance with a round disc from an angle and with an 
elliptical disc head on; and so on. It is also a consequence of the view that looks 
indistinguishable from those grounded in some such way may on occasion be 
entirely ungrounded in any acquaintance: this is precisely characteristic of 
hallucination. So introspectively indistinguishable perceptual experiences may 
have quite different fundamental natures according to (OV). For their 
fundamental nature is characterized precisely in terms of the subject’s 
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acquaintance, from a given point of view and in specific circumstances, with 
particular material objects in the world around him. 
 
Many commentators find this consequence objectionable.25 For they simply 
assume that the only adequate explanation of introspective indistinguishability 
must cite an identity at the level of the fundamental philosophical 
characterization of the experiences in question. (OV) explicitly rejects this 
principle; and I claim that the rejection is entirely compatible with the criterion 
of explanatory adequacy on theories of perception that I endorsed at the outset. 
For (OV) provides a perfectly adequate alternative explanation of introspective 
indistinguishability in such cases in spite of distinct fundamental experiential 
constitution, by appeal to the ‘visually relevant similarities’ account of looks and 
the ‘negative epistemic’ account of hallucination, both sketched above.26 
 
Perhaps this exchange illuminates an interesting distinction, or possibly a 
continuum, between philosophical approaches in the area. Top-down theorists 
begin with a conception of what conscious perception is for: it makes thought 
and knowledge about the world possible. Then they derive an account of what 
such perception must be, at least in its central cases, in order to do this. Bottom-
                                                        
25 Brogaard makes the objection in her Chicago APA comments. 
26 Notice that the case of hallucination is, as it were, the limiting case of this 
explanation. In every other case, introspective indistinguishability is grounded in 
the presence of the same visually relevant similarities between pairs of cases of 
acquaintance with different worldly objects from different points of view and/or 
in different perceptual circumstances. Pure hallucination is the residual case in 
which there is nothing except for the fact that the subject’s condition is not 
distinguishable by introspection alone from a case of acquaintance with a given 
qualitative scene from a specific point of view, ungrounded in actual 
acquaintance with anything. 
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up theorists begin with the most varied possible list of perceptual phenomena 
and an intuitive indistinguishability criterion of theoretical identities between 
them. Then they sculpt a theory that best follows the contours of that imposed 
taxonomy treating all cases as equal. My point here is that, if a top-down theory 
is capable of explaining, or at least accommodating, the more unusual 
phenomena assembled by those working from the bottom up, even whilst 
rejecting the identification of indistinguishable experiences, then those 
phenomena can be no ground for rejecting the top-down theory in question. 
Indeed, if its promise of making sense of what perception is for is met, then the 
top-down theory retains the upper hand. From this point view, what is lacking in 
the bottom-up approach is any sensitivity to the distinction, amongst the whole 
range of weird and wonderful perceptual phenomena, between the normal or 
paradigm cases that sustain the wider philosophical role in connection with 
thought and knowledge, on the one hand, and those that are instead some kind of 
failure, or deviation from this norm. Indeed, treating all cases alike and adhering 
to the indistinguishability criterion of identity may be in tension with an 
adequate account of the normal case. In §3.3 below I consider the question of 
whether (OV) can accommodate certain of the phenomena in the evidence base 
of opposing bottom-up theories. I end the current section with a sketch of this 
direct threat to the bottom-up approach generally, that the flattening effect of its 
introspective indistinguishability criterion of experiential identity stands in the 
way of any adequate account of the explanatory role of the normal case in 
connection with thought and knowledge. 27 
                                                        
27 What I present here is the barest sketch of an argument, glossing over 
numerous serious issues and difficulties. I intend to develop the argument in 
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Suppose that we partition perceptual experiences purely by introspective 
indistinguishability. Very crudely, equivalence classes will contain all and only 
those experiences in which things look exactly the same to their subject. Thus, 
each will contain all and only those experiences in which it looks to the subject as 
though there are objects with such and such properties arranged thus and so in 
the world around him. The characteristic feature of the maximally bottom-up 
approach to philosophical theorizing about perception, as I intend it, is that their 
membership of such an equivalence class exhausts the fundamental nature of 
every experience in it. That is to say, the fundamental nature of each such 
experience is precisely that it is one in which it looks as though there are objects 
with such and such properties arranged thus and so in the world around the 
subject.28 
 
Now, on the assumption that we are working with every actual and possible 
perceptual experience of a subject like us in a world like ours, then a privileged 
subset of the experiences in any given equivalence class will be wholly veridical-
perceptual: he actually sees that there are objects with such and such properties 
arranged thus and so in the world around him. Most will be partially veridical-
perceptual in this way and partially illusory, in various proportions and 
                                                                                                                                                              
detail elsewhere; but I hope that this rough and ready presentation at least 
indicates the direction of thought and the challenge facing the bottom-up 
approach. 
28 See n. 29 below for the top-down (OV) recognition of the fact that all the 
experiences in a given equivalence class have something in common, although 
this is absolutely not their fundamental nature and is in all but the totally 
hallucinatory case intelligibly grounded in their fundamental nature as conscious 
acquaintance with worldly objects from various points of view in various 
circumstances. 
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combinations. An outlying subset will be wholly hallucinatory. All are absolutely 
identical in fundamental nature. Just as (CV) aims to tame hallucinations as 
experiences of the very same fundamental kind as certain genuine perceptions – 
these are all cases of experientially entertaining a content concerning the way 
things are in the world around the subject – this bottom-up approach has the 
consequence that the perfectly veridical perceptions and all the various illusions 
in any given equivalence class of experiences are all identical in fundamental 
nature with its outlying wholly hallucinatory experience. These are all mere 
perturbations of consciousness, as it were, in which things look thus and so, 
entirely ungrounded in their fundamental nature in the subject’s actual relations 
with the world out there. 
 
It is true that all such experiences are introspectively indistinguishable from 
seeing various objects with such properties arranged thus and so in the world 
around him. But there is nothing more to the nature of this wholly veridical-
perceptual condition than there is to a complete hallucination in which things 
merely look just that way. So any idea of perception itself as a relation between 
minded subjects and the world that they inhabit that makes the particular 
constituents of that world available for thought and is revelatory of their actual 
nature in a way that serves as a source knowledge is seriously strained. The 
crucial role of perception in grounding thought and knowledge is quite 
mysterious. 
 
Contrast with this the (OV) understanding of perceptual experiences partitioned 
by introspective indistinguishability. These again fall into equivalence classes of 
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experiences in all of which things look exactly the same to their subject. But, 
except for the outlying total hallucination, such looks are in every case grounded 
in her conscious acquaintance with various particular objects in the world 
around her from various points of view and in various circumstances of 
perception. This grounding constitutes the fundamental nature of the 
experiences in question and so serves intelligibly to explain the role of 
perception in making thought and knowledge of the world possible. Total 
hallucinations are limiting cases of experiences merely introspectively 
indistinguishable from such acquaintance, from actually seeing various objects 
with such and such properties arranged thus and so in the world around her.29 
 
Proponents of (CV) find this account of hallucination unsatisfactory. But one way 
to put the current objection to the bottom-up approach is that it produces 
theories of perception on which all perceptual experiences are brutely 
indistinguishable by introspection from certain perceptions: that is most 
fundamentally what they are. Furthermore, there is nothing more that can be 
said about the veridical perceptions themselves either, that supposedly support 
this entire experiential structure: they are most fundamentally experiences that 
are simply indistinguishable by introspection from various hallucinations. So the 
whole account is in serious danger of coming crashing down. 
 
                                                        
29 Note, as indicated in n. 28 above, that all experiences in a given equivalence 
class share the property of being introspectively indistinguishable from the 
condition of conscious perceptual acquaintance with specific worldly objects 
from a specific point of view in specific circumstances. In all but the totally 
hallucinatory case, this is grounded in some such conscious worldly 
acquaintance. In the totally hallucinatory case it is simply ungrounded. 
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§3.3. Problem Cases 
 
Can (OV) adequately accommodate the more peripheral and abnormal 
experiential phenomena that its opponents object are inconsistent with its 
acquaintance-based account of the way things look in perception? It will be 
evident in what follows that the distance between the accommodation and 
complete explanation of such phenomena may increase as such phenomena 
diverge from normal perception. But I take this to be inevitable and perfectly 
acceptable on the top-down approach that gives the normal case philosophical 
explanatory priority and construes more peripheral cases as a kind of failure or 
deviation from the norm. I have already sketched two resources available in the 
(OV) account of simple illusion and total hallucination respectively: the existence 
of visually relevant similarities between an object of acquaintance, from a given 
point of view and in specific circumstances, and paradigm exemplars of a kind of 
which it is not itself an instance; and the idea of experiences that are simply 
indistinguishable by introspection alone from cases of acquaintance with a given 
qualitative scene from a specific point of view in the absence of any grounding in 
acquaintance. I now consider two additional resources available in 
accommodating further phenomena that opponents object are a threat to the 
position: degraded acquaintance; and hallucinatory projection. 
 
§3.3.1 Degraded Acquaintance 
 
Conscious visual acquaintance is a relation between subjects, mind-independent 
worldly objects, and their spatiotemporal point of view and relevant 
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circumstances that we are enabled to stand in by the evolutionarily established 
and fine-tuned integration of our perceptual systems with the relevant ways of 
the world. Given such conscious acquaintance with an object, o, from a given 
point of view and in specific circumstances, then o thinly looks F iff o has, from 
that point of view and in those circumstances, appropriate visually relevant 
similarities with paradigm exemplars of F; o thickly looks F iff o thinly looks F 
and the subject registers its visually relevant similarities with paradigm 
exemplars of F. In cases in which there is some abnormality in, damage to, or 
interference with, the processes enabling acquaintance, or an extension beyond 
their normal domain of operation, then degraded acquaintance may result, in 
which only some of the more determinable (less determinate) thin looks of the 
objects of acquaintance may be available and registered in thick looks. In 
general, the thin ways things look are given by all its visually relevant similarities 
with relevant paradigms from the point of view and in the circumstances in 
question. Acquaintance with o from this point of view and in these circumstances 
brings these into consciousness for potential registration. Degrading reduces the 
thin looks available for registration in certain respects and on certain 
dimensions to merely determinable looks. 
 
For example, blurred vision may in certain cases involve a failure of acuity in 
boundary determination. In such cases the object of acquaintance certainly has 
visually relevant similarities with objects of a range of different sizes and shapes. 
Thus it looks determinably boundaried within that range. For whatever reason, 
though, the subject’s acquaintance is degraded. So it does not look of any more 
determinate size and shape. 
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It has been objected to any view along these lines that it fails adequately to 
distinguish the perception of fuzzy objects from the blurred perception of sharp 
objects.30 My reply is to claim that this distinction is precisely absent at the level 
of thin looks, but that it absolutely does shows up, phenomenologically, at the 
level of thick looks. Suppose, first, that I am acquainted with a fuzzy object, such 
as a cloud, perhaps, whose boundary is not precise. Its boundary is determinably 
within a certain spatial range, but not determinately located more precisely than 
that. It has, from my point of view and in the circumstances, appropriate visually 
relevant similarities with paradigm exemplars of something determinably 
boundaried thus – within such and such a spatial range. Indeed, it may well be 
just such an exemplar. Hence it thinly looks merely determinably boundaried 
within that range. Thinking about its spatial extent, I may register just those 
similarities and it therefore thickly looks, as it is, indeterminately boundaried. 
This I take to be a further genuine feature of the way things are for me 
phenomenologically.31 Second, suppose that I am peering at a sharp-edged white 
rock without my glasses. My acquaintance with it is therefore degraded, and, 
although it actually has appropriate visually relevant similarities with paradigm 
exemplars of a something determinately shaped and extended, only its more 
determinable looks are available to me. Once again it thinly looks merely 
determinably boundaried within a given range. I may mistakenly categorize it as 
actually indeterminately boundaried. In which case it thickly, and illusorily, looks 
                                                        
30 The objection is due to Smith (2008). For discussion of blurred vision and its 
role in constraining theories of perception see Tye (2003), Allen (2013), and 
French (in preparation). 
31 See Brewer (2011, ch. 5) for more on the phenomenology of thick looks. 
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fuzzy. On the other hand, I may rightly recognize the source of its thinly looking 
merely determinately boundaried as down to me, and correctly resolve the thin 
ambiguity that way, as it were. Again, this is a genuinely phenomenological 
matter, and to mark it, we say that I see the rock blurrily. So (OV) captures the 
genuine phenomenological distinction with the perception of fuzzy objects in the 
context of its basic appeal to blurred vision as degraded acquaintance.32 
 
I take red-green colour-blindness, at least of certain kinds, to be a second 
example of degraded acquaintance. The way things look is again constituted by 
their highly determinable visually relevant similarities: the tomato looks 
coloured, of a certain brightness, and perhaps we might even say that it looks 
red-or-green. It may be difficult for normally sighted subjects to be any more 
specific because there is nothing more specific to say. Perhaps it looks greyish, as 
the red and green snooker balls look indistinguishably grey on back and white 
TV. Maybe this goes some way towards capturing the visually relevant 
similarities between them that characterize the determinable looks of both to 
red-green colour-blind subjects. In any case, such subjects’ visual systems are 
sensitive only to colour-like features shared by red and green things. So their 
acquaintance with them is degraded in such a way that they only have conscious 
access to their appropriately determinable looks. 
 
                                                        
32 Since the distinction I propose between perception of fuzzy objects and 
blurred perception of sharp objects is made at the level of thick looks, it depends 
on the registration of visually relevant similarities. Nevertheless, as pointed out 
in §1 above, I happily acknowledge the existence of less cognitively demanding 
modes of registration than the fully conceptual paradigm. So the distinction is 
perfectly available in the case of non-concept-using animals. 
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(OV) may exploit this idea of degraded acquaintance and correspondingly 
determinable looks in accommodation of many more peripheral perceptual 
phenomena too. I take the above as illustrative for present purposes and turn 
now to hallucinatory projection. 
 
§3.3.2 Hallucinatory Projection 
 
According to (OV), hallucinations are experiences whose fundamental nature is 
simply that they are indistinguishable by introspection alone from cases of 
acquaintance with a given qualitative scene from a specific point of view. These 
may be caused by neurophysiological intervention or narcotic ingestion. They 
may also be caused by external objects. For example, a hammer blow to the head 
may cause a hallucination of stars or the scent of certain paints may cause 
hallucinations of various, perhaps related, coloured lights. Visual stimuli may 
even cause systematically related visual hallucinations. For example, bright 
lights of certain colours may cause hallucinations of patches of light of related 
colours apparently located on a wall in front of the subject. (OV) accounts for 
after-images in just this way, as experiences introspectively indistinguishable 
from acquaintance with patches of light of the relevant colour on the surfaces 
before the subject. Notice that such hallucinations are conjoined with genuine 
perception of the surfaces themselves on which they appear. This is what I mean 
by the projection of hallucinations onto genuine objects of acquaintance, and 
such hallucinatory projection provides a rich resource for the accommodation of 
peripheral and abnormal perceptual phenomena within the (OV) framework. 
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Hermann’s Grid is a case in point. This is normally classified as an illusion: pale 
grey patches illusorily appear at the intersections of the white channels formed 
by a grid of closely spaced black squares. (OV) offers an alternative explanation 
of the phenomenon as a hallucinatory projection onto the stimuli grid 
systematically caused by its closely packed black squares. We are acquainted 
with the grid of black squares itself, and this experience is conjoined with a 
systematic hallucination introspectively indistinguishable from acquaintance 
with light grey patches at the intersections of the white channels between these 
black squares that is projected onto it somewhat in the manner of an after-image. 
 
I end the current section by considering a fascinating phenomenon whose 
accommodation plausibly involves the conjunction of degraded acquaintance 
and hallucinatory projection.33 Philosophers working on visual perception are 
now quite familiar with type-1 blindsight, in which subjects have the ability to 
discriminate visual stimuli but report having no associated sensory 
consciousness: they regard their successful discrimination as pure guesswork.34 
In type-2 blindsight, on the other hand, patients are consciously aware of 
external objects, in some sense at least, and can determine some of their 
features; but the phenomenology of their experience does not correspond 
directly with any such features of the objects that they thereby detect.35 That is 
to say, the ways things look, on the basis of which subjects are able to determine 
                                                        
33 Thanks to Berit Brogaard for raising this case in her Chicago APA comments. 
34 The locus classicus introduction to blindsight is Weiskrantz (1986). There is a 
great deal of philosophical discussion of the phenomenon. See, for example, Eilan 
(1998) and Brogaard (2011), both of which also contain helpful further 
references. 
35 For helpful discussion and references see Foley (forthcoming) and Sullivan-
Bissett (forthcoming).  
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various features of the objects around them, are not simply the looks that those 
very objects actually have from the point of view in question and in the relevant 
circumstances. This is apparently in tension with the (OV) account of looks. 
 
The strategy that I propose in response is to combine the resources of degraded 
acquaintance and hallucinatory projection. Suppose we take at face value the 
idea that type-2 blindsight patients are consciously aware of the objects around 
them. That is to say, according to (OV), they are visually acquainted with those 
very things. But, due to their neurological condition, their acquaintance is 
seriously degraded. So they only have conscious access to their highly 
determinable looks, such as their visually relevant similarities simply with 
something shaped and sized within quite an extensive range, moving, or pulsing, 
for example. Furthermore, their condition may also produce experiences of 
hallucinatory projection onto these objects of their acquaintance. And although 
these may be systematically correlated with certain of the features of the 
relevant worldly objects, as the colours of after-images are correlated with the 
colours of the bright lights that produce them, they are not directly revelatory of 
the ways those things actually are or look from the point of view in question. A 
full (OV) account of any individual case would have to combine these two 
elements as appropriate to its specific details. But I see no difficulty in principle 
with such a combination, and it certainly yields a rich variety of options and 
possibilities. 
 
In any case, patients may exploit their prior knowledge of such a correlation 
between certain of the ways things look in perception and the ways that they are 
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told they are in order to use their perceptual experience as a source of new 
knowledge of the way things are in the world around them on any particular 
occasion – rather as I may use the position of the needle on my speedometer as a 
source of knowledge about the speed that I am driving. They will also thereby 
recognize, as they do, the peculiarity of their predicament. For the looks on the 
basis of which they learn that there are objects with such and such properties in 
the world around them are not, in their case, unlike in ours, straightforwardly 
the looks of those things from their point of view in the relevant circumstances. 
Some of them, at least, are instead instrumental hallucinatory indicators of what 
is out there before them. 
 
§4 Conclusion 
 
I began by distinguishing three approaches to developing a philosophical theory 
of perception. I have said relatively little about the first of these, on which 
perception consists most fundamentally in a relation of acquaintance with 
various mind-dependent sensations, other than to register my conviction that it 
fails with respect to both explanatory adequacy and metaphysical acceptability. I 
have refined and extended my objections to the second, (CV), according to which 
perception consists most fundamentally in our representation of things as being 
thus and so in the mind-independent world around us. Finally, I have argued that 
my own (OV) implementation of the third approach, on which perception 
consists most fundamentally in a relation of conscious acquaintance with the 
constituents of the mind-independent world themselves meets the explanatory 
adequacy with respect to empirical thought and knowledge, and with respect to 
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phenomenological variety, in a metaphysically acceptable and defensibly top-
down way. I conclude that (OV) is a theory worthy of serious consideration. 
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